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I. INTRODUCTION
Agriculture is a critical industry to Nebraska’s economy, generat-
ing over $21 billion in cash receipts and $6.9 billion in agricultural
exports in 2011.1  Indeed, despite the many changes in agriculture
over the years, agriculture is as prevalent in our modern society as
ever before.  For example, some people have experienced large hog
confinements setting up shop in areas near their homes.2  Others ex-
press concern for the source of their food and sustainability of agricul-
ture, demonstrated in recent advertising campaigns by the restaurant
chain Chipotle.3  Many more remember the contributions of Norman
Borlaug in developing a disease-resistant, high-yield strain of wheat
that saved hundreds of millions of people worldwide from starvation—
a contribution that continues to influence crop genetics today.4  No
matter the specific issue, concerns and opinions about agriculture are
part of the everyday public discourse in Nebraska agriculture.
The Nebraska Supreme Court contributed to this discourse with its
decision in Butler County Dairy, L.L.C. v. Butler County.5  The court
addressed the issue of whether a local township possessed the author-
ity to enact environmental ordinances, including a ban on pipelines
carrying liquid livestock waste, and whether state law preempted
1. NEB. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ET AL., NEBRASKA AGRICULTURE FACT CARD (2013), http://
www.nda.nebraska.gov/facts.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/CN8K-B9UT.
2. See generally CAROLYN JOHNSEN, RAISING A STINK: THE STRUGGLE OVER FACTORY
HOG FARMS IN NEBRASKA (Charles A. Francis et al. eds., 2003) (describing the
growth of factory hog farming in Nebraska and the interplay between farmers,
neighbors, pork producers, politicians, environmentalists, and agribusinesses in
navigating this industry).
3. Elizabeth Weiss, What Does “The Scarecrow” Tell Us About Chipotle?, NEW
YORKER (Sept. 23, 2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/N9BY-F9DV.
4. See generally LEON HESSER, THE MAN WHO FED THE WORLD (2006).  Known as
the Father of the Green Revolution, Dr. Borlaug was the only person during the
twentieth century to be “awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for work in agriculture
and food.” Id. at ix.
5. 285 Neb. 408, 827 N.W.2d 267 (2013).
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those ordinances.6  The court found that the township did indeed pos-
sess the requisite statutory authority7 and state law did not preempt
the township’s regulations.8  With the modernization of agriculture
bringing new environmental challenges in Nebraska, courts are sure
to face similar issues as in Butler County Dairy as to the role of local
governments in regulating their agricultural neighbors.  In fact, while
most environmental regulation of agriculture has been in the hands of
state and federal governments, the recent trend has been for local gov-
ernments to provide their own regulations,9 as did the township in
Butler County Dairy.  The legal and practical ramifications of the
court’s decision to uphold this local authority are detailed throughout
this Note.
This Note focuses on the legal doctrine known as Dillon’s Rule and
whether the Nebraska Supreme Court should have more fully consid-
ered Dillon’s Rule in its interpretation of local government authority.
Part II of this Note provides a legal background for local government
law, particularly in the area of townships, and describes the legal doc-
trines of Dillon’s Rule and preemption.  Part III continues with a sum-
mary of the facts and the court’s holding in Butler County Dairy.  Part
IV considers the legal developments in other jurisdictions and dis-
cusses the consequences of the court’s refusal to apply a Dillon’s Rule
framework.  Part IV concludes with a discussion of the court’s implicit
call to the Nebraska Legislature for statutory reform.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Authority of Townships to Legislate
In order to understand whether a township or any other local gov-
ernment body has the authority to legislate, one must first have a ba-
sic knowledge of local government structure in Nebraska.  Nebraska is
divided into ninety-three counties10  which contain numerous villages
and cities.11
6. Id. at 410–11, 827 N.W.2d at 274.
7. Id. at 429, 827 N.W.2d at 285.
8. Id. at 437, 827 N.W.2d at 290–91.
9. Christopher A. Novak, Agriculture’s New Environmental Battleground: The Pre-
emption of County Livestock Regulations, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 429, 430–31
(2000). See also Thomas R. Head, III, Local Regulation of Animal Feeding Opera-
tions: Concerns, Limits, and Options for Southeastern States, 6 ENVTL. LAW 503,
537 (2000) (explaining that “[n]otwithstanding the various federal and state reg-
ulation of certain operations, many local governments increasingly have felt the
need or political pressure to impose local requirements or controls” and have done
so “through a variety of mechanisms”).
10. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 22-101 to -193 (Reissue 2012).
11. See generally All Nebraska Local, City, County Websites, NEBRASKA.GOV, http://
www.nebraska.gov/community/local-city-county-websites.html (last visited Oct.
19, 2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/3TUG-4PE7.
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A county can be further broken down into either a commissioner
system or township system.12  Specifically, the law in Nebraska pro-
vides that:
The powers of the county as a body corporate or politic, shall be exercised by a
county board, to wit: [i]n counties under township organization by the board of
supervisors, which shall be composed of the town and such other supervisors
as are or may be elected pursuant to law; in counties not under township or-
ganization by the board of county commissioners.13
The township finds its origins in the Anglo-Saxon era of England,
in a time when a community of people lived on a homestead, a farm, or
a village, and surrounded the area of land with an enclosure to form a
township.14  Early American colonists brought this form of local gov-
ernment with them to the New World.15  Since their implementation
during the early colonial period and statehood, townships have essen-
tially remained unchanged and have only undergone change when ad-
aptation was needed.16  In essence, a township “is a subdivision of
state territory, convenient in area, for the purpose of carrying into ef-
fect limited powers governmental in their nature.”17
County citizens can exercise their voting rights to implement town-
ship organization.  Nebraska law provides that in a county’s general
election, “the qualified voters in any county may vote for or against
township organization in such county.”18  Once this system is adopted,
the county attorney, clerk, and treasurer select seven supervisors.19
This board of supervisors has multiple enumerated powers, including
the power to implement necessary bylaws and to raise “money by tax-
ation . . . for the prosecution or defense of suits by or against the
town.”20  Indeed, “[t]he purely local affairs” are entrusted to the town-
ship supervisors.21
The distinguishing feature of a township is its “more popular and
democratic form of government,” with “the idea of local self govern-
ment being the essence of the township system.”22  Indeed, a township
12. Butler Cnty. Dairy, L.L.C. v. Butler Cnty., 285 Neb. 408, 416, 827 N.W.2d 267,
277–78 (2013) (citing Van Horn v. State, 46 Neb. 62, 64 N.W. 365 (1895)).
13. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-103 (Reissue 2012).
14. 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1:32 (3d ed.
2010).
15. Id.
16. State ex rel. Newman v. Columbus Twp. Bd., 15 Neb. App. 656, 660, 735 N.W.2d
399, 404 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007) (citing 87 C.J.S. Towns § 4 (2000)).
17. State v. Bone Creek Twp., Butler Cnty., 109 Neb. 202, 204, 190 N.W. 586, 587
(1922).
18. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-201 (Reissue 2012).
19. Id. § 23-207.
20. Id. § 23-224.
21. Van Horn v. State, 46 Neb. 62, 71, 64 N.W. 365, 367 (1895).
22. Wilson v. Ulysses Twp. of Butler Cnty., 72 Neb. 807, 811, 101 N.W. 986, 988
(1904).
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“is one of the rare examples in Nebraska of direct democracy.”23  This
idea of self-government inherent in a township is the major difference
between a township and a county.24
In addition to knowing what a township is, one must also under-
stand the sources of a township’s regulatory authority.  This requires
a top-down review of government structure.  Whenever a unit of gov-
ernment chooses to act on an issue, it must first have the authority to
do so.25  The federal government derives its power from the Constitu-
tion of the United States, including the Supremacy Clause,26 which
provides that federal law reigns supreme over state law.27  Therefore,
“state laws which ‘interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Con-
gress’ are unconstitutional.”28  Certain powers, however, are reserved
for the states,29 including the inherent authority under the police
powers “to protect the health, safety and welfare” of their citizens.30
States, on the other hand, exercise complete dominion over their
smaller governmental counterparts.  As a result, local governments
can only derive their power “from either the state constitution, their
local charter, or, most commonly, state legislation.”31
For example, Nebraska operates in part under a doctrine known as
“home rule.”  The first home-rule charter appeared in Missouri’s con-
stitution in 1875.32  Nebraska adopted its own constitutional provi-
23. State ex rel. Newman v. Columbus Twp. Bd., 15 Neb. App. 656, 660, 735 N.W.2d
399, 404 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007).
24. Wilson, 72 Neb. at 810–11, 101 N.W. at 988.
25. Charles W. Abdalla & John C. Becker, Jurisdictional Boundaries: Who Should
Make the Rules of the Regulatory Game?, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 7, 18 (1998).
26. Head, supra note 9, at 539.
27. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land . . . .” Id.
28. Head, supra note 9, at 539 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211
(1824)).
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.  “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.” Id.
30. Abdalla & Becker, supra note 25, at 14.
31. JESSE J. RICHARDSON, JR. ET AL, IS  HOME RULE THE ANSWER?  CLARIFYING THE
INFLUENCE OF DILLON’S RULE ON GROWTH MANAGEMENT 3 (2003), http://
www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/dillonsrule.pdf, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/C5FK-4JGC.  Local government units often are called “creatures”
of the state. Id.
32. 2A MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, § 9:8 (2006).  Although this case not does not focus
on home rule authority, the reader should know that home rule is thought of as a
reaction to Dillon’s Rule, and thus the two doctrines often are considered counter-
parts.  See Charles J. Bussell, As Montville, Maine Goes, So Goes Wolcott, Ver-
mont?  A Primer on the Local Regulation of Genetically Modified Crops, 43 SUFF.
U. L. REV. 727, 735 (2010).
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sion in 1912.33  Article XI, section 2 of the Nebraska Constitution
provides, in relevant part, “[a]ny city having a population of more than
five thousand (5000) inhabitants may frame a charter for its own gov-
ernment, consistent with and subject to the constitution and laws of
this state . . . .”34  The benefit of home rule authority is that it gives
local governments the power to govern their “local” affairs and allows
them to “avoid interference from the state.”35
Because the Nebraska Constitution only provides for a home rule
charter for cities comprised of more than 5,000 people and lacks any
express provision applying a home rule charter to townships,36 town-
ships are vested only with the power expressly given to them by stat-
ute.37  Further, because townships are political subdivisions of the
state government, their “right to act is dependent upon a grant from
the state.”38
Nebraska statutory law provides that “[e]very town shall have
[the] corporate capacity to exercise the powers granted thereto, or nec-
essarily implied, and no others.”39  An early Nebraska Supreme Court
decision mirrored this strict limitation of power when the court articu-
lated, “[t]he powers with which [townships] are entrusted are powers
segregated and carved out from the mass of the sovereignty of the
state.”40  A state sometimes gives a township these powers as a matter
of convenience because a township is in a better position to perform
particular functions.41  A township’s purpose “is to carry into effect
with ease and facility certain powers and functions which are govern-
mental in their nature, and which may be more readily and conve-
niently carried on by subdivision of the territory of the state into
smaller areas.”42
33. NEB. CONST. of 1875, art. XI, § 2 (1912).
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 10–11.
36. See generally NEB. CONST.
37. Butler Cnty. Dairy, L.L.C. v. Butler Cnty., 285 Neb. 408, 418, 827 N.W.2d 267,
278 (2013). See discussion infra subsection II.B.1.
38. 1 MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, § 1:33.
39. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-223 (Reissue 2012).  A township is sometimes called a town,
so the use of the word “town” in this statute is meant to refer to a “township.”
State ex rel. Newman v. Columbus Twp. Bd., 15 Neb. App. 656, 660, 735 N.W.2d
399, 404 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007).
40. Wilson v. Ulysses Twp. of Butler Cnty., 72 Neb. 807, 812, 101 N.W. 986, 988
(1904).
41. Id. at 812, 101 N.W. at 988 (holding that townships “are subdivisions of the state
government upon which, for convenience, certain powers have been conferred,
strictly limited, however, to the exercise of certain functions more easily carried
out by subdivision”).
42. Id.
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B. Limitations on Local Authority
A finding that a township or other municipal government entity
has regulatory authority to enact a regulation does not end the in-
quiry.  The next question is whether either Dillon’s Rule43 or preemp-
tion by state law44 limits that regulation or ordinance.  If the
regulation is restricted by either of these two methods, it is invalid.
1. Dillon’s Rule
Because Nebraska townships do not operate under home rule au-
thority,45 and because their power is derived from the state, their
grants of authority often are construed under a doctrine known as Dil-
lon’s Rule.  In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, John Dillon, a
federal judge, advanced his theory that a local government is a crea-
ture of the state that can only exercise those powers given to it by an
act of the state.46  Judge Dillon’s philosophy arose out the increasing
autonomy of, and corruption in, local governments and their promo-
tion of private economic activity.47  Particularly prevalent was the lo-
cal governments’ pursuit of railroad companies, which often led to the
invasion of private property rights in the quest for revenue and eco-
nomic development.  It was this “conflict between private property
rights and local government pursuit of revenue” that troubled Judge
Dillon.48  In developing his ideals of limiting local governments’ au-
thority, Judge Dillon believed that:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation
possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those
granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or inci-
dent to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplish-
ment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation,—not simply
convenient, but indispensable.  Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt con-
cerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corpora-
tion, and the power is denied. . . .  All acts beyond the scope of the powers
granted are void.49
43. See RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 6.
44. See Abdalla & Becker, supra note 25, at 15–16.
45. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
46. Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law:  A Critical
Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 260 (2000). See JOHN F. DILLON, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 237–39 (5th ed. 1911)
[hereinafter COMMENTARIES].
47. RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 7.
48. Id.
49. COMMENTARIES, supra note 46, § 237 (citation omitted).  Nebraska courts have
recognized Judge Dillon’s trifurcated legal standard. See Consumers’ Coal Co. v.
City of Lincoln, 109 Neb. 51, 189 N.W. 643 (1922) (observing Judge Dillon’s rule
of strict construction for construing the authority to enact ordinances); In re Ap-
plication of Lincoln Elec. Sys., 265 Neb. 70, 655 N.W.2d 363 (2003) (also recogniz-
ing the rule of strict construction for legislative grants), overruled on other
grounds by Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004).
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Judge Dillon proposed a rule of strict construction to be applied in
determining the extent of the express, implied, or indispensable pow-
ers.50  Although Judge Dillon felt that construction should be “just,”51
he also asserted that “any ambiguity or fair, reasonable, substantial
doubt as to the extent of the power is to be determined in favor of the
State or general public, and against the State’s grantee.”52  Overall,
Judge Dillon recognized that although these principles are well-set-
tled, courts have struggled to apply them because of the “complex
character of municipal duties” and the wide range of powers which
municipalities are authorized to exercise.53
Judge Dillon observed that, in some respects, the root of the prob-
lem rested with the state legislatures that were granting the power to
municipalities.  He felt that too often these powers were “extraordi-
nary” and “extra-municipal” because they were “incautiously or un-
wisely granted” or because the enacting legislation was “carelessly
worded” and “loosely construed.”54  Therefore, the authority granted
to local governments by state legislatures “ought to be more carefully
defined and limited, and should embrace such objects only as are nec-
essary for the health, welfare, safety, and convenience of the inhabi-
tants.”55  But because the power of a state government reigns
supreme over a municipality, the legislature ultimately has the ability
to limit the power of local government.56  Perhaps most pointedly, the
legislature “may erect, change, divide, and even abolish [a municipal-
ity’s powers], at pleasure, as [the legislature] deems the public good to
require.”57  So, while legislatures often carelessly draft grants of au-
thority, in the end they possess the supremacy to redefine their grants
of authority and to determine what a local government can and cannot
do.
According to Judge Dillon, the judiciary should also play a part in
curbing unwarranted local authority.  In addition to the rule of strict
construction,58 Judge Dillon instructed state courts to “require munic-
ipalities ‘to show a plain and clear grant for the authority they assume
to exercise; to lean against constructive powers, and, with firm hands,
to hold them and their officers within chartered limits.’”59
50. COMMENTARIES, supra note 46, § 239.
51. Id.  According to Judge Dillon, a “just” construction requires an initial considera-
tion of “the legislative intent in order to give it fair effect.” Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. § 18.
55. Id.
56. Note, Dillon’s Rule: The Case for Reform, 68 VA. L. REV. 693, 694–95 (1982).
57. JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 30 (1872).
58. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
59. Note, supra note 56, at 695 (quoting JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 9 (2d ed. 1873)).
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Judge Dillon did, however, recognize some limited benefits of local
control: local citizens have a greater investment in, and knowledge of,
their communities than that of the “distant central power.”60  Today,
the fear of waste, extravagance, and ineptitude which justified Dillon’s
Rule in its early years has subsided, and many local governments in
the modern era are sophisticated legal bodies unlikely to make frivo-
lous and corrupt decisions.61
Despite its century-old origins and the dwindling fear of inept local
governments, Dillon’s Rule has many modern justifications, and its
principles still find application today.62  Modern scholars offer an
abundance of reasons for supporting Dillon’s Rule.63  First, Dillon’s
Rule keeps state sovereignty intact “by ensuring that municipalities
exercise only as much power as the state delegates to them.”64  Dil-
lon’s Rule also tempers some of the effects of local politics.  If local
governments enact exclusionary or provincial regulations, often as a
result of local bias and/or political pressures, courts are able to step in
and protect minority interests and state policy.65  Additionally, Dil-
lon’s Rule ensures compliance with the federal and state constitutions,
state statutes, and state policies.66  Financial considerations also play
a role, because “[s]tate agencies often have greater budgets and tech-
nical expertise than local agencies.”67  Not only that, “Dillon’s Rule
leaves most of the financial decision making powers at the state level”
so municipalities do not “undercut the revenue base of state govern-
ments.”68  Finally, and perhaps most relevant to this Note, is the justi-
fication that Dillon’s Rule leads to greater uniformity in the law.69
This consistency among the law “facilitates economic growth by assur-
ing companies that requirements such as business licenses and meth-
ods of taxation will be consistent throughout the state.”70
60. COMMENTARIES, supra note 46, § 18.  In addition, Judge Dillon acknowledged that
past experience dictates that local governments should retain some ability to en-
act local legislation. Id.
61. Note, supra note 56, at 705.
62. Id. at 707.
63. See, e.g., Louis V. Csoka, The Dream of Greater Municipal Autonomy: Should the
Legislature or the Courts Modify Dillon’s Rule, a Common Law Restraint on Mu-
nicipal Power?, 29 N.C. CENT. L.J. 194 (2007); Note, supra note 56.
64. Note, supra note 56, at 707.
65. Csoka, supra note 63, at 211; Note, supra note 56, at 707.
66. Note, supra note 56, at 707–08.
67. Csoka, supra note 63, at 210.
68. Id. at 211.
69. Id. at 210.
70. RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 14.
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2. Preemption
In addition to Dillon’s Rule, preemption also operates to limit local
authority.71  The doctrine of preemption in Nebraska is fairly well-
settled.  Preemption finds its roots in “the fundamental principle that
‘municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the
laws of the state.’”72  Therefore, when a municipal ordinance and a
state statute directly conflict, the statute preempts the ordinance.73
Preemption is grounded in legislative intent, particularly “whether
the legislature intended to deny municipalities the right to legislate
on the subject.”74  The courts must determine the “purpose and intent
of the Legislature” through the “plain, ordinary, and popular” mean-
ing of the language of the statute, and must construe the state and
local enactments as compatible if at all possible.75
A state law may preempt a municipal ordinance in one of three
ways:  (1) express preemption, (2) field preemption, and (3) conflict
preemption.76  Express preemption exists when the Legislature “ex-
pressly declare[s] in explicit statutory language its intent to preempt
municipal ordinances.”77  A court will find field preemption by infer-
ring the Legislature’s intent to preempt a municipal ordinance from
the “comprehensive scheme of legislation.”78  Finally, a state law will
preempt a municipal ordinance to the extent they actually conflict.79
A local “ordinance is inconsistent with a statute if it is contradictory in
a sense that the two legislative provisions cannot coexist. . . .  Gener-
ally, an ordinance cannot prohibit what the Legislature has expressly
licensed, authorized, or permitted.”80  Whether the issue is express,
71. For a more thorough analysis of preemption’s role in the debate over local envi-
ronmental regulations, aside from what is provided in this Note, see Weiland,
supra note 46.
72. State ex rel. City of Alma v. Furnas Cnty. Farms, 266 Neb. 558, 567, 667 N.W.2d
512, 521 (2003) (quoting 5 MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, § 15.20 (1996)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 567–68, 667 N.W.2d at 521 (citing 5 MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, § 15.18
(2013)).
75. Id. at 568, 667 N.W.2d at 521–22.
76. Id. at 568–69, 667 N.W.2d at 522.
77. Id. at 568, 667 N.W.2d at 522.
78. Id. This intent to preempt the field “need not be expressly declared” and “may be
implied from the nature of the subject matter being regulated and the purpose
and scope of the state statutory scheme.”  5 MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, § 15:18
(2013).  Further, “an ordinance may cover an authorized field of local laws not
occupied by general laws, or may complement a field not exclusively occupied by
the general laws.” Id. (citation omitted).  But, if “the state has occupied the field
of prohibitory legislation on a particular subject, a municipality lacks authority to
legislate with respect to it.” Id.
79. Furnas Cnty. Farms, 266 Neb. at 569, 667 N.W.2d at 522 (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 569, 667 N.W.2d at 522–23 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Herman v. Lee, 210 Neb. 563, 567, 316 N.W.2d  56, 59 (1982)).
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field, or conflict preemption, the analysis calls for a case-by-case study
of the relevant facts and circumstances.81
III. BUTLER COUNTY DAIRY, L.L.C. V. BUTLER COUNTY
A. Facts and Procedural Posture
Nestled two miles north of Surprise, Nebraska, and just inside
Read Township, Butler County, Butler County Dairy, L.L.C. (BCD), is
home to 6,000 dairy cows.82  Opened by owner Todd Tuls in 2008,83
this dairy is part of a Nebraska dairy industry that, in 2009, boasted
58,000 dairy cows and approximately 250 dairy farmers.84  Between
his two Nebraska dairies, Tuls owns more than 20% of the state’s
dairy cows as of 2013.85
In 2007, the Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality
(DEQ) approved a dairy permit allowing BCD to construct and operate
a livestock waste control facility pursuant to the Livestock Waste
Management Act (LWMA).86  BCD’s livestock waste disposal plan in-
volved pumping liquid manure from its lagoon system, transporting it
by pipeline to several center pivot irrigation systems,87 and applying
81. Leah N. Hansen, Note, Canadian Connection v. New Prairie Township: Sniffing
out an Opening in the Doctrines of Preemption and Conflicts of Law, and Allowing
Local Governments the Authority to Regulate Odor Concerns, 3 GREAT PLAINS
NAT. RESOURCES J. 177, 183 (1999).




83. AGRIC. PROM. & DEV. DIV., NEB. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NEBRASKA: DAIRY’S NEW WORLD
OF OPPORTUNITY 5, http://www.nda.nebraska.gov/publications/promotion/dairy_
expansion.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/9GY3-
TXTD.
84. Lisa Munger, Meadow Gold Closing Changes Landscape for Dairy Farmers, LIN-
COLN J. STAR, Apr. 20, 2009, http://journalstar.com/news/local/meadow-gold-clos-
ing-changes-landscape-for-dairy-farmers/article_3505e923-0e00-5d9c-b9a5-0432
0e4221a8.html#.UgGmIh1CHxE.email, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/BTB3-
PN6P.
85. Id. Tuls’s two Nebraska dairies, Butler County Dairy and Double Dutch Cream-
ery, near Rising City, Nebraska, account for 12,000 of Nebraska’s 58,000 dairy
cows. Id.
86. Butler Cnty. Dairy, L.L.C. v. Butler Cnty., 285 Neb. 408, 411, 827 N.W.2d 267,
274 (2013).  The Livestock Waste Management Act is codified in NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 54-2416 to -2438 (Reissue 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2012).  It classifies livestock
facilities according to size so that “operations with 300 animal units or more
[must] be inspected” by the DEQ “to determine whether livestock wastes contam-
inate surface or ground water.” J. DAVID AIKEN, LIVESTOCK WASTE MANAGEMENT
ACT 1 (2001).
87. Larry Peirce, Supreme Court Upholds Butler County Dairy Ruling, COLUMBUS
TELEGRAM, Mar. 19, 2013 [hereinafter Supreme Court Upholds BCD Ruling],
http://columbustelegram.com/banner-press/news/supreme-court-upholds-butler-
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it to cropland through the pivots.88  To carry out this plan, BCD had to
apply for a permit from Read Township and Butler County to install a
pipeline under road No. 27.  The road was located primarily in Butler
County and partially in Read Township.89  In September 2007, Read
Township adopted a township regulation that provided:  “No person
shall be allowed to place on, over or under town property, including
town roads, right-of-ways and ditches, any pipeline which carries liq-
uid livestock waste.”90  One week later, at its regular board meeting,
it denied BCD’s application for a permit.91  Butler County followed
suit in February 2009, denying the permit on the basis of not wanting
to override Read Township’s decision.92
BCD filed a complaint in the District Court for Butler County, Ne-
braska, in March 2009 against Read Township, asking for declaratory
and injunctive relief, as well as damages for the expenses of operating
without a pipeline.93  BCD asserted that the pipeline regulation went
beyond the scope of Read Township’s authority and that it was pre-
empted by the LWMA,94 the DEQ’s livestock waste control regulations
in Title 130 of the Nebraska Administrative Code (Title 130),95 and
county zoning laws.96  BCD also alleged that a second township regu-
lation—which implemented minimum setback requirements for large
livestock confinement facilities; required the facilities “to demonstrate
that livestock waste would not be carried onto township property in
the event of a 25-year storm; and prohibited the spillage of livestock
waste onto township roads, ditches, or property from such facilities or
during transport”—was invalid.97  Summit Township, Butler County,
subsequently intervened, seeking a ruling from the court as well on
the ground that it had regulations identical to those of Read Town-
ship.98  The district court denied the parties’ three separate motions
for summary judgment because Butler County was not a named
party.99  Because the court decided that Butler County had control
over road No. 27, it determined that Butler County was a necessary
party and ordered BCD to file an amended complaint naming Butler
county-dairy-ruling/article_a995da10-06e1-5c9e-a373-36768656e685.html#.
UgGnyDWwkNk.email, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/7PFX-LTNK.
88. Butler Cnty. Dairy, 285 Neb. at 411, 827 N.W.2d at 274.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 419, 827 N.W.2d at 279.
91. Id. at 411, 827 N.W.2d at 274.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 412, 827 N.W.2d at 274–75.
94. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 54-2416 to -2438 (Reissue 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
95. 130 NEB. ADMIN. CODE (2011).
96. Butler Cnty. Dairy, 285 Neb. at 412, 827 N.W.2d at 274–75.
97. Id. at 412, 827 N.W.2d at 275.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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County as a defendant.100  Following a hearing, the district court con-
cluded that BCD was not entitled to relief or damages and granted
summary judgment in favor of Butler County, Read Township, and
Summit Township.101
First, the district court determined the Read Township possessed
the statutory authority to implement the two township regulations.102
Second, the district court determined that state law did not preempt
the Read Township regulations, finding that none of the three types of
preemption—express, field, and conflict—were present.103  Although
BCD alleged preemption under both LWMA104 and Title 130,105 the
court did not address preemption under Title 130.106  Finally, the
court found no preemption by the zoning laws because it determined
the regulations were not zoning laws but rather were created through
Read Township’s legislative authority.107
On appeal, BCD argued that Read Township’s regulations ex-
ceeded its statutory authority and that Nebraska Revised Statutes
(NRS) section 23-224108 did not provide statutory authority for the
regulations.109  It also asserted that LWMA, Title 130, and county
zoning statutes preempted the Read Township regulations.110  Fi-
nally, BCD alleged Butler County improperly deferred to Read Town-
ship’s authority in enacting the pipeline and that Butler County was
not a necessary party.111
100. Id.
101. Id. at 415, 827 N.W.2d at 276.
102. Id. at 413, 827 N.W.2d at 275.  It is interesting to note, however, is that the
court’s holding did not translate into a ruling that Read Township had control
over road No. 27.  In fact, the court did not make a determination of whether
Butler County or Read Township had control over the road in question because
both parties had denied BCD’s request for a permit anyway. Id. at 413–14, 827
N.W.2d at 276.
103. Id. at 414, 827 N.W.2d at 276.
104. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 54-2416 to -2438 (Reissue 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
105. 130 NEB. ADMIN. CODE (2011).
106. Butler Cnty. Dairy, 285 Neb. at 414, 827 N.W.2d at 276.
107. Id. at 414–15, 827 N.W.2d at 276.
108. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-224 (Reissue 2012).  This statutory provision enumerates
the powers granted to the electors who are present at the township’s annual
meeting.  These powers include, among others, the authority “[t]o take all neces-
sary measures and give directions for the exercise of” the electors’ corporate pow-
ers, “[t]o prevent the exposure or deposit of offensive or injurious substances
within the limits of the town,” and “[t]o make such bylaws, rules, and regulations
as may be deemed necessary to carry into effect the powers herein granted and to
impose such fines and penalties . . . as shall be deemed proper . . . .” Id.
109. Butler Cnty. Dairy, 285 Neb. at 415, 827 N.W.2d at 277.
110. Id.
111. Id. BCD did not present an argument regarding Summit Township’s regulations,
so the court did not address them. Id.
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B. The Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion
The Nebraska Supreme Court addressed three main issues in its
opinion:  (1) whether Read Township possessed the requisite statutory
authority to enact its regulations relating to the pipeline ban and
large livestock confinement facilities, particularly the second regula-
tion’s 25-year storm provision;112 (2) whether LWMA,113 Title 130,114
and county zoning statutes preempted the regulations; and (3)
whether Butler County was, in fact, a necessary party.
1. The Authority to Regulate Liquid Livestock Waste Pipelines
and Large Livestock Confinement Facilities
The Nebraska Supreme Court first addressed Read Township’s au-
thority to enact its pipeline ban and its authority to regulate large
livestock confinement facilities through minimum setback, 25-year
storm, and spillage prevention requirements.115  After giving a thor-
ough explanation of Nebraska township organization,116 the court
then considered Read Township’s authority to enact the pipeline ban
through a two-part analysis:  (1) whether Read Township was vested
with authority over township roads; and (2) whether Read Township
possessed the authority to ban the pipeline under NRS section 23-
224(6).117  Only if both of these conditions were satisfied could Read
Township have legally enacted the pipeline regulation.118
In finding Read Township did have general authority over town-
ship roads, the court designated road No. 27 as a public road located
entirely within Butler County and partially within Read Township.119
Then, the court interpreted NRS sections 39-1402120 and 39-1520121
to mean that Butler County and Read Township have concurrent au-
thority over road No. 27.122  In doing so, the court reasoned, because
112. A 25-year, 24-hour rainfall event “is the largest amount of rain which could be
expected to fall during any 24 hour period with a 25 year time span.” J. DAVID
AIKEN, ANNETTE M. HIGBY & NANCY L. THOMPSON, A FARMER’S HANDBOOK ON
LIVESTOCK REGULATION IN NEBRASKA 2 (1994), http://agecon-cpanel.unl.edu/
LivestockRegHandbook94.pdf, arhived at http://perma.unl.edu/TZ6J-CU8G.
113. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 54-2416 to -2438 (Reissue 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
114. 130 NEB. ADMIN. CODE (2011).
115. Butler Cnty. Diary, 285 Neb. at 416, 827 N.W.2d at 277.
116. Id. at 416–19, 827 N.W.2d at 277–79.
117. Id. at 419–20, 827 N.W.2d at 279.
118. Id. at 420, 827 N.W.2d at 279–80.
119. Id. at 421, 827 N.W.2d at 280.
120. Section 39-1402 provides, in relevant part, that “[g]eneral supervision and control
of the public roads of each county is vested in the county board.” NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 39-1402 (Reissue 2008).
121. Section 39-1520 provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ll township road and culvert
work shall be under the general supervision of the township board . . . .” Id. § 39-
1520.
122. Butler Cnty. Dairy, 285 Neb. at 421, 827 N.W.2d at 280.
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section 39-1402 merely vested, but did not require, the exercise of gen-
eral supervisory power in county boards, and because it did not pro-
vide for the power vested in county boards to be exclusive, the two
statutes did not conflict.123  Therefore, the two statutes imply that a
county board and a township board, in this case, Butler County and
Read Township, “are both vested with general supervisory authority
over a township road.”124  The court supported this notion that the
two political entities could possess concurrent authority over public
roads within a township so long as the statutes do not conflict.125  The
court qualified this statement by adding that in the hierarchy of Ne-
braska political subdivisions, counties sit higher than townships, and
therefore, although the powers are concurrent, they are not equal.126
Using this hierarchy, the court also looked at the interrelation be-
tween county and township powers over township roads and deter-
mined, “the exercise of a county’s authority over township roads can
supersede a township’s authority over those same roads.”127  The
court explained, “(1) a township can exercise authority over township
roads until the point in time at which a county assumes control, (2)
the assumption of control by a county supersedes the authority of a
township, and (3) a county can assume control by improving the
road.”128  As to road No. 27, Butler County had not exercised control
over the road and thus did not supersede Read Township’s author-
ity.129  In fact, Butler County was not responsible for maintenance of
the road and had a policy of sending any matter relating to a public
road within a township to the individual township.130  Because Read
Township enacted the pipeline ban in 2007, and Butler County did not
exercise control over Read Township’s roads prior to 2009, “Read
Township possessed general supervisory authority over those town-
ship roads.”131
The court also found Read Township had not exceeded its statutory
authority by enacting the liquid livestock waste pipeline ban, conclud-
ing that NRS section 23–224(6) grants Read Township enough author-
ity to prohibit a liquid livestock waste pipeline.132  Section 23-224(6)
123. Id. at 421, 827 N.W.2d at 280.
124. Id. at 422, 827 N.W.2d at 281.
125. Id. at 421–22, 827 N.W.2d at 281 (citing SID No. 2 v. Cnty. of Stanton, 252 Neb.
731, 567 N.W.2d 115 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 39-1524, 39-1907 (Reissue
2008)).
126. Id. at 423, 827 N.W.2d at 282.
127. Id. at 424, 827 N.W.2d at 282.
128. Id. at 425, 827 N.W.2d at 283.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 426, 827 N.W.2d at 283.  Based on this discussion, the court additionally
concluded that Butler County properly deferred to Read Township’s decision to
enact the pipeline ban. Id. at 426, 827 N.W.2d at 284.
132. Id.
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provides, “[t]he electors present at the annual town meeting shall
have power . . . [t]o prevent the exposure or deposit of offensive or
injurious substances within the limits of the town.”133  By giving the
words of the statute their ordinary meaning, and construing the lan-
guage strictly, the court determined liquid livestock waste was, in
fact, an offensive or injurious substance as contemplated by the stat-
ute.134  To support this conclusion, the court noted, at the time the
Nebraska Legislature created LWMA135 and Title 130,136 the Legisla-
ture was aware that livestock waste is potentially harmful if not man-
aged well, because it included provisions in LWMA relating to the
unlawfulness of not building approved livestock waste control facili-
ties and discharging animal waste without a permit or exemption.137
Further, Title 130’s definition of livestock waste “expressly
recogniz[es] that livestock wastes are pollutants.”138  Quoting the lan-
guage of the statute, the court held section 23-224(6) gave Read Town-
ship the authority “to ‘prevent the exposure or deposit of’ livestock
waste within the township.”139  Going one step further, the court also
decided that the “pipeline ban was a proper exercise of the authority
to ‘prevent the exposure or deposit of livestock waste” in Read Town-
ship.140  A pipeline ban was a reasonable means to prevent the ac-
cumulation of waste on township roads, so it “fell within one of Read
Township’s limited statutory powers and was not an invalid exercise
of township authority.”141
Because of these foregoing conclusions, Read Township had “gen-
eral authority over township roads and specific authority to enact a
liquid livestock waste pipeline ban,” and the regulation “was a valid
exercise of Read Township’s statutory authority.”142  The court also
concluded that Read Township possessed the authority to regulate
large livestock confinement facilities, in particular through the use of
133. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-224(6) (Reissue 2012).
134. Butler Cnty. Dairy, 285 Neb. at 427, 827 N.W.2d at 284.
135. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 54-2416 to -2438 (Reissue 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
136. 130 NEB. ADMIN. CODE (2011).
137. Butler Cnty. Dairy, 285 Neb. at 427–28, 827 N.W.2d at 284.
138. Id. at 428, 827 N.W.2d at 285.  This definition provides that livestock waste is
any “animal and poultry excreta and associated feed losses, bedding, spillage or
overflow from watering systems, wash and flushing waters, sprinkling waters
from livestock cooling, precipitation polluted by falling on or flowing onto an
animal feeding operation, and other materials polluted by livestock wastes.”  130
NEB. ADMIN. CODE. § 1-027.
139. Butler Cnty. Dairy, 285 Neb. at 428, 827 N.W.2d at 285 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 23-224(6) (Reissue 2012)).
140. Id. (quoting § 23-224(6)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 429, 827 N.W.2d at 285.
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minimum setback, 25-year storm, and spillage prevention
requirements.143
2. Preemption Issues
Turning to preemption, the court first noted the absence of Ne-
braska case law involving the issue of preemption of township laws by
state law and decided that the case law discussing the preemption of
municipal law would provide a legitimate comparison.144  Therefore,
the same principles of preemption apply to both municipal law and
township law.145
The court quickly disposed of any argument that LWMA146 and
Title 130147 “expressly preempt local laws on the subject of livestock
waste management.”148  Noting that in the past, the Nebraska Legis-
lature included provisions explicitly stating its intent for the statutory
scheme to preempt local laws, govern the entire subject, or prohibit
local governments from enacting conflicting legislation, the court
pointed out the absence of this language in the LWMA.149
On the issue of field preemption, the court found two clear exam-
ples of “intent for these state statutes and regulations to coexist with
local laws . . . .”150  The first clear indication that the LWMA151 and
its regulations were not meant “to occupy the entire field of livestock
waste management regulation”152 was LWMA section 54-2420.153
Section 54-2420 states nothing in LWMA’s permitting provision, sec-
143. Id. at 430, 827 N.W.2d at 286. In a matter of first impression, the court distin-
guished between facial and as-applied challenges in an action raising a question
of statutory authority. Id. at 429, 827 N.W.2d at 835.  The court made this dis-
tinction because BCD was challenging the regulation before even being affected
by it, and thus its complaint constituted a facial challenge. Id.  This led to the
conclusion that “when a party challenges the validity of a township regulation
without arguing that a particular application of the regulation is improper,” the
court “will consider that to be a facial challenge that can succeed only ‘by estab-
lishing that no set of circumstances exists under which the [regulation] would be
valid.’” Id. (quoting State v. Harris, 284 Neb. 214, 221, 817 N.W.2d 258, 268
(2012)).  Because BCD did not establish that there were no circumstances under
which the regulation would be valid, its facial challenge to this second township
regulation lacked merit. Id. at 430, 827 N.W.2d at 286.
144. Id. at 431, 827 N.W.2d at 286.
145. Id. at 431, 827 N.W.2d at 287.  For an explanation of preemption, see supra sub-
section II.B.2.
146. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 54-2416 to -2438 (Reissue 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
147. 130 NEB. ADMIN. CODE (2011).
148. Butler Cnty. Dairy, 285 Neb. at 433, 827 N.W.2d at 288.
149. Id.; REV. STAT. §§ 54-2416 to -2438.
150. Butler Cnty. Dairy, 285 Neb. at 434, 827 N.W.2d at 288.
151. REV. STAT. §§ 54-2416 to -2438.
152. Butler Cnty. Dairy, 285 Neb. at 433, 827 N.W.2d at 288.
153. NEB. REV. STAT. § 54-2420 (Reissue 2010).
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tion 54-2419,154 “shall be construed to change the zoning authority of
a county that existed prior to May 25, 1999.”155  The second clear indi-
cation came from the DEQ’s enforcement of LWMA156 and the associ-
ated regulations.157  The court noted that throughout the permit
application process, the DEQ continually advised applicants to comply
with all local laws.158  Therefore, field preemption did not exist.159
Finally, the facts did not support a finding of conflict preemption.
At issue was the difference in the 25-year storm requirement—Read
Township’s ordinance required yearly updates of 25-year storm dem-
onstrations, while LWMA160 and Title 130161 only require “demon-
stration of compliance with the 25-year storm requirement when
applying for a construction and operating permit.”162  Although Read
Township’s regulation was more stringent, “[t]he fact that a local law
is more stringent than state law does not by itself lead to conflict pre-
emption.”163  Because BCD argued conflict preemption only on the ba-
sis of the ordinance being more stringent, the court concluded that
alone that was insufficient to show conflict preemption.164
BCD also argued that county zoning statutes preempted Read
Township’s regulation regarding setback requirements.165  At the
time of trial, however, Butler County had not enacted any county zon-
ing laws, and so there were no zoning laws to preempt the setback
regulation.166  Thus, “Read Township’s regulation imposing setback
requirements was not preempted by county zoning statutes.”167  Fi-
nally, the court decided that Butler County was in fact a necessary
154. Id. § 54-2419.
155. Id. § 54-2420.
156. Id. §§ 54-2416 to -2438.
157. Butler Cnty. Dairy, 285 Neb. at 434, 827 N.W.2d at 288.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. REV. STAT. §§ 54-2416 to -2438.
161. 130 NEB. ADMIN. CODE (2011).
162. Butler Cnty. Dairy, 285 Neb. at 436, 827 N.W.2d at 290. See 130 NEB. ADMIN.
CODE § 8-002.
163. Butler Cnty. Dairy, 285 Neb. at 436, 827 N.W.2d at 290.
164. Id. at 437, 827 N.W.2d at 290.
165. Id. at 437, 827 N.W.2d at 291.
166. Id. at 437–38, 827 N.W.2d at 291.
167. Id. at 438, 827 N.W.2d at 291.  Note that even though BCD argued the district
court incorrectly ruled that the regulation involving setback requirements did not
constitute zoning and that townships do not have the authority to enact a zoning
ordinance, the court would not consider the argument on appeal because BCD did
not assign as error Read Township’s lack of authority in its brief. Id.
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party.168  Based on the foregoing conclusions, the court affirmed the
judgment of the district court.169
IV. ANALYSIS
Read Township relied on NRS section 23-224170 for its authority to
prohibit BCD’s liquid livestock waste pipeline.171  Ultimately, the
court found the statute vested Read Township with this authority.172
Once the court made this critical move, it then completed the next
step of analysis by concluding that state law did not preempt Read
Township’s ordinances.173  One can question the court’s swift accept-
ance of Read Township’s statutory authority and whether Dillon’s
Rule ought to have played a role in construing Read Township’s au-
thority more strictly.  While the consequences of this move by the
court are yet to be determined, weak preemption analysis, initiated by
the court so easily finding authority that rests in local government,
has led to a stream of decisions in Nebraska which pose significant
hurdles for the agricultural industry.
As noted, NRS section 23-224(6) provides “[t]he electors present at
the annual town meeting shall have the power . . . [t]o prevent the
exposure or deposit of offensive or injurious substances within the lim-
its of the town.”174  The statutory language does not mention roads,
yet the court construed the statute as granting Read Township “suffi-
cient authority to prohibit liquid livestock waste pipelines.”175  Con-
sidering Dillon’s Rule may operate to “confine municipal power to that
168. Id. at 439, 827 N.W.2d at 292.  A necessary party “is one whose interest in the
subject matter of the controversy is such that the controversy cannot be finally
adjudicated without affecting” the necessary party’s interest. Id. at 439, 827
N.W.2d at 291.  Because the court had earlier held Butler County and Read
Township were vested with concurrent jurisdiction over township roads and that
the township “could exercise its authority over those roads only if the county had
not as yet superseded the township’s authority,” the decision as to whether Read
Township possessed sufficient authority to regulate township roads “necessarily
involved a determination of the rights of Butler County—namely, whether Butler
County had exercised power over township roads such that it superseded the
township’s otherwise concurrent authority.” Id. at 439, 827 N.W.2d at 291–92.
169. Id. at 440, 827 N.W.2d at 292.
170. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-224 (Reissue 2012).
171. In particular, see id. § 23-224(2), (6), and (7).
172. Butler Cnty. Dairy, 285 Neb. at 426, 827 N.W.2d at 284. See supra subsection
III.B.1 (discussing the language of section 23-224(6) and the court’s interpreta-
tion and conclusion).
173. Butler Cnty. Dairy, 285 Neb. at 437, 827 N.W.2d at 290–91.
174. REV. STAT. § 23-224(6).
175. Butler Cnty. Dairy, 285 Neb. at 426, 827 N.W.2d at 284.  The author recognizes
that the court did find that Read Township had concurrent authority over road
No. 27 pursuant to NRS section 39-1520, but this Note focuses solely on NRS
section 23-224 and its failure to mention anything about roads or pipelines.
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which the statute grants literally,”176 then certainly, with no mention
of a road or pipeline, the statute strictly excludes such types of ac-
tions.  Additionally, legislative history reveals that the Nebraska Leg-
islature originally enacted the statute over a century ago, in 1895.177
Since 1895, the issues facing townships and the solutions to those is-
sues undoubtedly have changed.178  Perhaps it is time to reconsider
archaic statutes such as section 23-224 which only offer either overly-
general or impractical provisions.  Although this is simply a broad
statement of where potential problems lie, the following analysis will
develop these issues more fully. Specifically, this Note will consider
why the court’s failure to consider more deeply a strict construction of
section 23-224(6) has significant repercussions, not only for the agri-
cultural industry, but for future cases in which a township uses its
statutory authority to enact local regulations.
A. Placing Butler County Dairy in Context with Other
Courts’ Decisions
Courts in Nebraska have had the opportunity to review the issue of
state law preemption over local ordinances in the context of livestock
agriculture, as have courts in other jurisdictions.179  Placing the deci-
sion in Butler County Dairy in the context of other decisions is helpful
in understanding the ramifications of the court’s decision.  Although
this Note does not aim to parse through each and every relevant deci-
sion, it is important to know that these decisions exist and how the
legal development in Nebraska compares.
A seminal case appeared in Iowa in the late 1990s.  In Goodell v.
Humboldt County, the issue was whether a county’s four ordinances
regulating large livestock confinement facilities and operations were
valid.180  At the heart of this dispute was how particular state laws
were to be interpreted and the laws’ resultant effect on the county’s
authority to enact regulations.181  As is usually done in this type of
analysis,182 the Supreme Court of Iowa conducted a two-part inquiry
questioning the county’s authority—in this case, home rule author-
176. Note, supra note 56, at 695 (emphasis added).
177. 1895 Neb. Laws 137.
178. For example, consider that the statute which enumerates the powers of township
electors gives authority “[t]o guard against the destruction of property in the
town by prairie fire.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-224(9) (Reissue 2012).
179. Goodell v. Humboldt Cnty., 575 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa 1998); State ex rel. City of
Alma v. Furnas Cnty. Farms, 266 Neb. 558, 667 N.W.2d 512 (2003); Craig v.
Cnty. of Chatham, 565 S.E.2d 172 (N.C. 2002).
180. Goodell, 575 N.W.2d at 489.  The four ordinances contained requirements for pre-
construction and pre-operation permits, financial security, groundwater protec-
tion policies, and toxic air emissions. Id. at 489–90.
181. Id. at 492.
182. See supra section II.B.
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ity183—and the state of Iowa’s power to preempt local regulations.184
The plaintiffs, proponents of hog confinement facility construction, ar-
gued “that the regulation of livestock confinement feeding operations
is a matter of statewide concern” and that the operations were not a
“local affair” under home rule.185  However, the court held otherwise,
finding that “[e]nsuring that livestock operations within a county are
conducted in such a manner as to avoid contamination of the environ-
ment and interference with others’ enjoyment and use of their prop-
erty is a matter of local concern and is, therefore, a ‘local affair’ within
the meaning of the home rule amendment.”186  Although the Hum-
boldt County Board of Supervisors had properly enacted the ordi-
nances, the Supreme Court of Iowa found, after a detailed preemption
analysis, that Iowa law preempted the ordinances.187
North Carolina also faced the issue in Craig v. County of Chat-
ham,188 where the county’s Board of Commissioners enacted two ordi-
nances, one governing waste (including financial responsibility for
contaminations), setback distances, and well testing, and the other
implementing zoning regulations for swine farms that operate animal
waste management systems of a certain design capacity.189  Because
counties are creatures of the state and only have those powers granted
to them, the Supreme Court of North Carolina looked to the laws of
North Carolina and found that counties have “the power and author-
ity to enact ordinances.”190  The court qualified this, though, with a
finding that another state statute191 limits a county’s power by pro-
viding that an ordinance must be consistent with North Carolina
law.192  This declaration dovetailed into the court’s preemption analy-
183. Iowa’s constitution grants home rule authority by providing that counties have
the power “to determine their local affairs and government,” but only to the ex-
tent that those determinations are “not inconsistent with the laws of the general
assembly.” IOWA CONST. art. III, § 39A.
184. Goodell, 575 N.W.2d at 492.
185. Id. at 494.
186. Id. Despite this finding, the court noted that a local matter still may have state-
wide importance, and the legislature can enact uniform statewide regulations or
preempt local control even if local regulations are described as concerning local
issues. Id.
187. Id. at 494–08.
188. Craig v. Cnty. of Chatham, 565 S.E.2d 172 (N.C. 2002).
189. Id. at 174–75.  The zoning ordinance at issue limited these particular swine
farms to the “Light Industrial” or “Heavy Industrial” zones of the county. Id. at
175.  The Board also enacted “Health Board Rules” nearly identical to the first
ordinance. Id.
190. Id. at 175–76.  The court found this authority in North Carolina General Statutes
section 153A-121(a) (2001), which provides that “[a] county may by ordinance de-
fine, regulate, prohibit, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions detrimental to the
health, safety, or welfare of its citizens . . . .”
191. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-174 (2000).
192. Craig, 565 S.E.2d at 176 (citing GEN. STAT. § 160A-174).
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sis, with the result being North Carolina’s swine farm laws preempted
the two regulations because the General Assembly “had provided a
‘complete and integrated regulatory scheme’ of swine farm
regulations.”193
A decade ago, Nebraska had the chance to rule on the battle be-
tween agricultural interests and local authority in State ex rel. City of
Alma v. Furnas County Farms.194  When the City of Alma (City)
learned that Furnas County Farms (FCF) and Sand Livestock Sys-
tems (SLS) “planned to build a large hog confinement facility” eight
miles northwest of the City, it enacted several ordinances195 and
claimed it had the authority to do so pursuant to NRS sections 17-
536196 and 17-537.197  Interestingly, FCF did “not challenge the au-
thority of the City to adopt the ordinances pursuant” to the statutory
provisions, so the court did not take up the issue.198  FCF only chal-
lenged the City’s authority within the framework of its preemption
argument.199  In the end, the Nebraska Environmental Protection Act
(NEPA) did not preempt the field of pollution control, although it did
preempt a small provision of one of the ordinances that provided for a
mandatory bond requirement because the requirement conflicted with
193. Id. at 176 (quoting Craig v. Cnty. of Chatham, 545 S.E.2d 455 (N.C. Ct. App.
2001)).  In particular, the court found that the General Assembly provided clear
expressions of intent to preempt the entire field of swine farm regulation through
its two swine farm regulations, the Swine Farm Siting Act and the Animal Waste
Management Systems component of the statewide regulations. Id. at 177–78.
Further, these two regulations were so comprehensive that there was no room
left for local regulation. Id. at 179.  As for the zoning ordinance, although it was
not per se invalid, it was invalid as written because it incorporated the first ordi-
nance, which had already been found to be preempted by the field of legislation.
Id. at 181.
194. State ex rel. City of Alma v. Furnas Cnty. Farms, 266 Neb. 558, 667 N.W.2d 512
(2003).
195. The ordinances, like others throughout this Note, “detail the process which an
entity seeking to build a livestock facility within 15 miles of the City must follow
in order to obtain a permit from the City for such purpose.” Id. at 561, 667
N.W.2d at 517.  This process includes complying with the Nebraska Department
of Environmental Quality’s requirements and with particular enumerated re-
quirements, such as soil testing. Id.
196. Section 17-536 provides that “[t]he jurisdiction of such city or village, to prevent
any pollution or injury to the stream or source of water for the supply of such
waterworks, shall extend fifteen miles beyond its corporate limits.” NEB. REV.
STAT. § 17-536 (Reissue 2012).
197. Section 17-537 provides that “[t]he council or board of trustees of such cities and
villages shall have power to make and enforce all needful rules and regulations in
the construction, use, and management of such waterworks, mains, portion or
extension of any system of waterworks or water supply and for the use of the
water therefrom.” Id. § 17-537.
198. Furnas Cnty. Farms, 266 Neb. at 561, 667 N.W.2d at 517.
199. Id.
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the NEPA.200  Aside from the mandatory bond requirement, the court
upheld the ordinances.201
As evidenced by these three decisions, some courts readily find the
existence of local authority, as did the Supreme Court of Nebraska
most recently in Butler County Dairy.  In contrast, other courts regu-
larly use preemption to strike down local laws, thus protecting their
state’s agricultural businesses.  In so doing, their decisions often are
more amenable to industry and a robust legislative process.202  As
noted, the focus of this Note is not the preemption question but in-
stead is the more perplexing question of why various states’ highest
courts so readily uphold a local municipality’s choice to act.203  In fact,
were courts not so swift to answer this first inquiry in the affirmative,
they would never even reach the preemption question.204  Thus,
problems arise from the Nebraska Supreme Court’s superficial treat-
ment of Read Township’s authority to enact its pipeline ban.
B. The Consequences of Nebraska’s Differing Stance
1. The Resultant Multiple Layers of Government
As noted above,205 Dillon’s Rule provides greater uniformity in the
law and prevents multiple “layers” of government regulations for agri-
cultural producers to muddle through when they operate or plan to
200. Id. at 572–74, 667 N.W.2d at 524–25.  FCF also attempted to argue that the
LWMA, the statute at issue in Butler Cnty Dairy, preempted the City’s ordi-
nances. Id. at 565, 667 N.W.2d at 520.  Interestingly, FCF did not raise this ar-
gument at the trial court level because the LWMA had not yet been enacted, and
although the LWMA was in effect by the time of appeal, the court dismissed any
argument to this effect because it had not been considered by the trial court. Id.
at 565–67, 667 N.W.2d at 520–21.
201. Id. at 572–73, 667 N.W.2d at 524–25.  The court also decided issues relating to
evidentiary errors, injunctive relief, and damages. Id. at 575–79, 667 N.W.2d at
526–29.
202. See infra subsection IV.C.1, calling for legislative reform in Nebraska.
203. The author recognizes the swiftness of the decision partially lies in the fact that
some local governments are acting under home rule authority, as in Goodell, but
the court in Craig was silent on the issue, and because home rule authority in
Nebraska only extends to cities with populations greater than 5,000 people, the
City of Alma in Furnas Cnty Farms also was acting without home rule authority.
See NEB. CONST. art. XI, § 2; Goodell v. Humboldt Cnty., 575 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa
1998) (describing the county’s home rule authority); Furnas Cnty. Farms, 266
Neb. at 560, 667 N.W.2d at 516 (describing the City of Alma as a city of the sec-
ond class and thus having a population of less than 5,000 people); Craig v. Cnty.
of Chatham, 565 S.E.2d 172 (N.C. 2002).
204. See Bussell, supra note 32, at 740 (explaining that “[c]ourts in Dillon’s Rule
states avoid implied preemption analysis altogether, as any reasonable doubt
concerning local authority is resolved by the courts against the local
government”).
205. See Csoka, supra note 63, at 210 (stating that “Dillon’s Rule may lead to greater
uniformity”).
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operate their businesses in a locality or multiple localities.  A benefit
to conformity of the law is greater economic prosperity because uni-
formity “allow[s] corporations to spread their sphere of influence more
readily throughout the state, without having to fear inconsistent legal
obligations.”206  Another benefit is that an agricultural producer will
not have his local government authority instructing him to comply in
one way, while the state—through the DEQ, for example—tells him to
comply in another way.  Essentially, Dillon’s Rule helps to avoid con-
flict between state, county, and other local laws, and increases the
ease with which agricultural producers can maximize their business
opportunities.207
In fact, both methods for limiting local authority, Dillon’s Rule and
preemption, are grounded in “the need to avoid dual regulation.”208
Thus, no matter the means courts use to approach the issue, the end is
the same, and local governments should be careful to regulate only in
ways that will not create insurmountable hurdles for local business
owners.
a. Recognizing Some Benefits of Local Government Control
These considerations require a recognition that delegating power
to local governments, with the resultant “layers,” is not necessarily
unfavorable.  In fact, local governments, including townships, villages,
cities, and counties, often are fully competent to handle their local is-
sues.209  For example, localities excel in protecting their local water
supply, so much so that state governments will designate them as the
sole authority for doing so.210  Perhaps, then, the court’s decision to
uphold Read Township’s ordinances as a valid exercise of statutory
authority211 is not so out of line.  The “[f]ear of local waste, extrava-
206. See id. See also RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 14 (explaining that uni-
formity “facilitates economic growth by assuring companies that requirements
such as business licenses and methods of taxation will be consistent throughout
the state”).
207. For example, imagine a dairy operator who has applied for and has been granted
the mandatory environmental permits from the state but is ineligible to operate
his business under county regulations.  These regulations would directly conflict
with state law.  Agricultural producers in this type of situation often do not know
“which way to turn.”  Novak, supra note 9, at 458–59.
208. Craig v. Cnty. of Chatham, 565 S.E.2d 172, 175 (N.C. 2002).
209. Note, supra note 56, at 705 (discussing the Virginia General Assembly’s practice
of granting authority for specific purposes to local governments because of the
governments’ ability to handle their local issues).
210. For example, Colorado has created local government entities, similar to metropol-
itan districts, whose sole duty is to manage the water supply and quality.  Nor-
man F. (Rick) Kron, Choice of Entity: Using Limited Purpose Local Governments
To Solve Problems, 38 COLO. LAW. 59, 60–61 (Oct. 2009).
211. Butler Cnty. Dairy, L.L.C. v. Butler Cnty., 285 Neb. 408, 429, 827 N.W.2d 267,
285 (2013).
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gance, and ineptitude” underlying Dillon’s Rule lacks justification in
modern society, where “professionally operated, sophisticated local
governments [are] unlikely to engage in the frivolous and corrupt
practices that Judge Dillon feared.”212  Additionally, providing for lo-
cal control in matters like water supply and waste disposal allows mu-
nicipalities to respond quickly when there is a local problem.213
Therefore, when an entity like Read Township is allowed to regulate
livestock waste, it can act almost immediately to enforce its regula-
tions or to respond to environmental hazards.
A part of the reason that localities such as Read Township are so
competent at handling local issues is because they are the ones most
familiar with the issues, desires, and needs of their citizenry.214  The
idea is that a township, a county, or a city has the right not to smell
like a feedlot,215 and that only those most closely-situated are in a
position to act in an effective way.216  Thus, sometimes multiple layers
of government are acceptable, and what the court did in Butler County
Dairy may not have such a dramatic effect that agricultural busi-
nesses cannot operate.  It would be unfair for this Note not to recog-
nize that reality.
b. The Resultant Multiple Layers in the Context of Butler
County Dairy
Despite these benefits of local control, the court’s decision in Butler
County Dairy also has disadvantages.  That Dillon’s Rule operates to
reduce the “layers” of multiple levels of legislation is particularly rele-
vant in context of the consequences that flow from the court’s broad
construction of local control.
The effect of the court’s holding is that it complicates matters for
business owners when they want to establish operations in a new lo-
cale or when they are currently operating under existing regulations
with which they already comply.  Specifically, agricultural producers
and local businesses generally “fear inconsistent legal obligations.”217
212. Note, supra note 56, at 705.
213. Csoka, supra note 63, at 209.
214. COMMENTARIES, supra note 46, § 18; Alexandra Manchik Barnhill, Note, En-
trenching the Status Quo: The Ninth Circuit Uses Preemption Doctrines to Inter-
pret CERCLA as Setting a Ceiling for Local Regulation of Environmental
Problems, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 487, 498 (2004).
215. In the Furnas Cnty Farms case, even local farmers expressed their concern about
the effect of the hog farm on their local water supply. JOHNSEN, supra note 2, at
33.
216. Barnhill, supra note 207, at 498 (stating that in particular, “[l]ocal governments
are usually the most familiar with the effects of local environmental problems,
thus municipalities are often in the best position to determine the appropriate
course of action in remediating contaminated property”). See supra notes 41–42,
60 and accompanying text.
217. Csoka, supra note 63, at 210.
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When the Furnas County Farms appeal was pending in the Nebraska
Supreme Court, local farmers worried about the slippery slope the
court would create if it upheld the City’s ordinances.218  Even though
many local farmers disfavored the hog farm being built, agricultural
producers often are “apprehensive” about their local government hav-
ing the power to regulate them.219  Thus, these particular farmers ex-
pressed concern that if the ordinances indeed were valid, then the City
would try to impose more regulations telling them “how to operate.”220
As one farmer, Terry Woollen, aptly stated, “It’s one of these things
where people do not like government intrusion until they have a prob-
lem and then they want government to be an intercessor on their be-
half.”221  And when a benefit of Dillon’s Rule is economic growth,222 a
logical conclusion is that courts limit this growth when they uphold
local regulations without giving more credence to Dillon’s Rule and its
positive effects.
When the court considered Read Township’s choice of a pipeline
ban, it analyzed this choice under a “reasonableness” framework.223
But recall that Dillon’s Rule is a rule of strict statutory construc-
tion.224  No express words225 of NRS section 23-224226 give Read
Township the go-ahead to dictate what can and cannot be done to
roads.  Further, it could hardly be said that outlawing pipelines is “es-
sential” to the objectives of Read Township227—whatever those objec-
tives may be—when a pipeline-center pivot system that is correctly
designed and operated offers many positive, environmentally-sound
benefits.228  And though Dillon’s Rule allows those powers “necessa-
rily or fairly implied,”229 it does not reach the standard of
“reasonableness.”




222. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
223. Butler Cnty. Dairy, L.L.C. v. Butler Cnty., 285 Neb. 408, 428, 827 N.W.2d 267,
285 (2013) (finding that “a ban on liquid livestock waste pipelines reasonably
could have been enacted as a means of ‘prevent[ing] the exposure or deposit of’
livestock waste on township roads . . . .”).
224. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
225. COMMENTARIES, supra note 46, § 237.
226. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-224 (Reissue 2012).
227. COMMENTARIES, supra note 46, § 237.
228. See generally WILLIAM L. KRANZ ET AL., APPLICATION OF LIQUID ANIMAL MANURES
USING CENTER PIVOT IRRIGATION SYSTEMS (2007), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/5XST-5H4G (describing proper materials, mechanisms, and in-
stallation for waste pipelines connecting a manure storage facility and a center
pivot, including requirements that must be met under the DEQ’s Title 130 regu-
lations, as well as offering information on odor control, water quality, soil conser-
vation and quality, pathogen transmission, and phytotoxic effects on plants).
229. COMMENTARIES, supra note 46, § 237.
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The language of the statute—that townships possess the authority
“[t]o prevent the exposure or deposit of offensive or injurious sub-
stances within the limits of the town”230—is overly broad, and “any
ambiguity or . . . substantial doubt as to the extent of [Read Town-
ship’s] power”231 ought to have been resolved in favor of the state.  In-
stead, as a result of the court’s decision, Tuls and numerous other
agricultural producers in Butler County now must parse through the
LWMA, the DEQ’s regulations in Title 130, county regulations, Read
Township’s pipeline ban, and any future ordinances passed under this
great deference to local legislation.
2. Addressing Century-Old Power Often Is Clouded by Local
Politics
Although the legal ramifications of the court’s move are para-
mount, practical consequences also flow from the decision to uphold
local power.
In small communities and rural areas, local politics often rule the
day.  Where local officials, sitting on their local school boards, church
councils, and county zoning committees, wield some degree of political
power, they may find themselves tempted to “favor political friends
and disfavor political enemies.”232  Further, because these communi-
ties often are made up of “economically and racially homogenous popu-
lations . . . the opportunity for a majority to act in a manner
insensitive to the interests of politically impotent minorities is great-
est at the local level.”233
By upholding Read Township’s authority to enact its liquid live-
stock waste ordinance, the court indirectly allows local politics to play
a role.  Had the court permitted Dillon’s Rule to operate, it may have
prevented the potential for “exclusionary and provincial actions by lo-
cal governments”234 because “to the extent the rule provides for some
judicial review of municipal decisions, it may safeguard both minority
interests and state policy from unfettered local biases.”235  The deci-
230. REV. STAT. § 23-224(6).
231. COMMENTARIES, supra note 46, § 239.
232. Csoka, supra note 63, at 211.
233. Note, supra note 56, at 708.  For example, Butler County, Nebraska, the county
at issue in this Note, has a population whose race was classified in 2012 as 98.2%
“white.” Butler County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/31/31023.html (last updated June 27, 2013),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/TT8W-F7SE.  Even in Nebraska’s most popu-
lated county, Douglas, this figure was 81.6% in 2012. Douglas County
QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/31/
31055.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/N3JV-T5ER (last updated June 27,
2013).
234. Csoka, supra note 63, at 211.
235. Note, supra note 56, at 707.
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sion of the Butler County Board of Supervisors to defer to Read Town-
ship’s ordinance236 because it “did not want to go against the wishes of
the township or start a precedent for similar requests” from dairy
owners like Tuls in the future,237 provides an example of this local
bias toward fellow political organizations when perhaps the issue
should be considered more fully.  Although one can only speculate as
to the political forces at play, surely local viewpoints played a part in
the discussion details of Read Township’s electors at the annual town
hall meeting or in general opinions about BCD.  Whether those view-
points will produce any lasting discriminatory effect is an inquiry that
probably is too premature to determine. However, it is important to
ponder the potentially different outcomes that could result were the
state to handle livestock regulation on a statewide level.
C. The Court’s Implicit Call for the Nebraska Legislature to
Step In
The Nebraska Supreme Court’s acceptance of Read Township’s lo-
cal authority arguably is an implicit call for the Nebraska Legislature
to step in and update its statutes.
The court is not entirely to blame for upholding Read Township’s
statutory authority.  Responsibility rests with the Legislature as well.
Perhaps the court in Goodell stated it best when it said:
In this matter of public interest, our court is limited to determining whether
Humboldt County had the authority to enact the challenged ordinances.  The
wisdom of those ordinances is not before us.  Nor is it our role to decide
whether local government should be allowed to regulate livestock confinement
operations.  The question before us is simply whether, under the constitution
and state law, the county can regulate in this area.238
Considerations of Dillon’s Rule aside, perhaps what the court in
Butler County Dairy was doing was interpreting the law that gave
Read Township authority and refusing to legislate from the bench.
The result is for the Nebraska Legislature to notice this move and act
accordingly.
Recall that Judge Dillon directed state legislatures to avoid draft-
ing “carelessly worded” and “loosely construed” statutes so as not to
give local governments “extra-municipal” power.239  Because state
governments and their legislatures reign supreme over their local gov-
ernments, they have the ability to redefine localities’ power.240  Thus,
the Nebraska Legislature should reevaluate the power it gave town-
236. Butler Cnty. Dairy, L.L.C. v. Butler Cnty, 285 Neb. 408, 411, 827 N.W.2d 267,
274 (2013).
237. Supreme Court Upholds BCD Ruling, supra note 87.
238. Goodell v. Humboldt Cnty., 575 N.W.2d 486, 493–94 (Iowa 1998).
239. COMMENTARIES, supra note 46, § 18.
240. Note, supra note 56, at 694–95.
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ships in 1895 when it enacted NRS section 23-224.241  Although the
“court cannot refuse to enforce a statute on the ground that it is un-
wise,”242 it can, when it sees a generally-defined statute, concede the
granting of local authority, conduct preemption analysis, and send a
signal to the Legislature that it is time to update these outdated stat-
utes so that they are more operable.  If not, local villages, counties,
and townships, seeing the ease with which their ordinances can be
upheld, will continue to pass restrictive regulations on agricultural
producers.243  The foreboding result is that while these regulations
may be directed at zoning-out the factory farms, their impact “also
falls upon small family farmers who are seeking to expand their
operations.”244
Until the Legislature acts, it appears that, so long as local govern-
mental units act “reasonably” within the statutory power conferred to
them, and construct regulations that avoid preemption by state law,
the Nebraska Supreme Court will uphold those regulations.  Indeed,
Nebraska is partial to local control.245  Practically, this may be why
the court found for BCD, and why it may continue to do so for similar
local regulations of agribusinesses in the future absent any responsive
action by the Legislature and despite any Dillon’s Rule considerations.
V. CONCLUSION
The modern changes in agriculture bring with them modern chal-
lenges.  Read Township addressed these challenges by enacting regu-
lations relating to liquid livestock waste pipelines and large livestock
confinement facilities.  The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld Read
Township’s statutory authority to do so and found state law did not
preempt these regulations.
Butler County Dairy raises questions as to the extent of local gov-
ernment control that should be allowed in the area of environmental
regulations.  Unfortunately, the court failed to consider this question
more deeply.  Townships are creatures of the state, and only have
those powers given to them, but when those powers are so easily up-
held, the court fails to draw any sort of meaningful line as to a permis-
sible level of authority.  Because Dillon’s Rule offers many modern
241. 1895 Neb. Laws 137.
242. Goodell, 575 N.W.2d at 493.
243. Obviously this was a concern of producers in Furnas Cnty Farms. See supra note
220 and accompanying text.  Further, one sees indications of it in Summit Town-
ship’s intervention to seek a judgment on its regulations that were identical to
Read Township’s regulations.  Butler Cnty. Dairy, L.L.C. v. Butler Cnty., 285
Neb. 408, 412, 827 N.W.2d 267, 275 (2013).
244. Novak, supra note 9, at 443.
245. JOHNSEN, supra note 2, at 37 (describing the state’s twenty-three natural re-
sources districts as just one example of many of Nebraska’s “fondness for local
control”).
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benefits, including financial stability, a non-biased political process,
and uniformity in the law, it ought to have played a larger role in the
court’s consideration of Read Township’s statutory authority.
As a result, agricultural businesses must navigate a complex field
of federal, state, and local environmental regulations.  The next step,
then, is for the Nebraska Legislature to critically evaluate the func-
tions it delegates to local governments and whether it needs to speak
more clearly in the area of environmental regulation.  Once every gov-
ernmental player knows its role, the parties involved will be able to
move forward for the benefit of Nebraska agriculture.
